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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Despite the signing of a comprehensive free trade 
agreement between New Zealand and China and 
significantly deepening trade relations, there 
exists a discernable lag in the investment 
relationship between the two countries. This 
paper identifies that the operation and 
interaction of the two legal instruments 
governing the conditions of entry of Chinese 
foreign direct investment (FDI) into New Zealand 
– the New Zealand–China Free Trade Agreement 
(NZCFTA) and the New Zealand Overseas 
Investment Act 2005 – partially explain this 
disparity. These legal instruments offer an 
interesting illustration of the way in which 
international investment agreements (IIAs) 
interact with domestic law, managing the 
contention between investor rights and host state 
public interests. However, it is clear that the 
rights and obligations created by these legal 
instruments are not well understood by Chinese 
investors and New Zealand commentators alike, 
as illustrated by the recent Crafar farms saga. 
This paper seeks to clarify those rights and 
obligations, arguing that greater transparency 
and predictability in the operation of the legal 
instruments is necessary in order to encourage 
higher levels of Chinese FDI in New Zealand. This 
is particularly important in the New Zealand– 
China relationship as Chinese investors are still 
relative newcomers in the establishment of 
overseas investments and face in New Zealand a 
culturally different regulatory scheme from that 
operating in China. 
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I Introduction 
 
In 2008, New Zealand became the first OECD country to sign a free trade 
agreement (FTA) with China. The New Zealand–China Free Trade Agreement 
(NZCFTA) is a comprehensive agreement directed at liberalizing and 
facilitating investment flows and trade in goods and services between the 
two states, while promoting cooperation in a number of other areas.1 New 
Zealand‟s economic relations with China have deepened since the signing of 
the NZCFTA, particularly in trade. China is now New Zealand‟s second- 
largest trading partner, overtaking the United States at the end of 2008 
shortly after the NZCFTA was signed. However, New Zealand‟s investment 
relationship with China remains considerably smaller, bilateral foreign 
direct investment (FDI) having not seen the same growth as trade in the 
wake of the Agreement. 
 
The New Zealand Government considers itself to have an open and 
welcoming attitude toward inward FDI and attracting FDI is a central part 
of the country‟s growth strategy. Therefore, it is concerning that there exists 
this discernable lag in inward FDI from China relative to the growing 
relationship in trade. The New Zealand Government‟s China strategy, 
“Opening Doors To China”, notes that while China invested 
approximately US$60 billion internationally in 2010/2011, Chinese 
investment in New Zealand in that period was only $1.87 billion.2  
There are a number of different reasons offered to explain this 
investment lag: (1) that Chinese investors are unaware of opportunities in 
New Zealand; (2) that the size of the deals in New Zealand are deemed 
inadequate for large-scale Chinese investors; (3) that other overseas 
investment destinations offer significant incentives, such as tax breaks, 
where New Zealand does not; and (4) that there are strict controls on the 
flow of outward Chinese investment.3 Furthermore, Young has identified 
that in the face of new economic relations, both the public and the 
business community take time to adapt before behind-the-border economic 
integration can really take hold.4 
 
This paper offers a complementary explanation; that the rights and 
obligations contained within the legal instruments managing the conditions 
of entry of Chinese investment into New Zealand – the New Zealand 
Overseas Investment Act 2005 (the Act) and the NZCFTA itself – are 
ambiguous and thus somewhat incompatible with the objectives set out in 
 
 
1 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) “The Agreement” (2 July 2010) New 
Zealand China Free Trade Agreement <www.chinafta.govt.nz/1- The-
agreement/index.php>. 
2 New Zealand Trade and Enterprise (NZTE) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade (MFAT) Opening Doors To China: New Zealand’s 2015 Vision (February 
2012) at 25. 
3 NZTE and MFAT, above n 2, at 25. 
4 Jason Young “Investing in the Economic Integration of China and New 
Zealand” 22 (China Papers, New Zealand Contemporary China Research 
Centre, 2012) at 4. 
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the investment chapter of the NZCFTA5 and the objectives of international 
investment agreements (IIAs)6 generally. Consequently, the lack of 
transparency and predictability in the operation and interaction of these 
legal instruments undermines the facilitation of higher FDI inflows. This is 
particularly notable in the New Zealand–China relationship because in 
contrast with many of New Zealand‟s traditional international economic 
partners, Chinese investors are still relative newcomers in the 
establishment of overseas investments and face in New Zealand a culturally 
different regulatory scheme from that operating in China. 
 
Part II of the paper sets up a framework for understanding the objectives 
underpinning the signing of IIAs generally, with a focus on the pre- 
establishment phase.7 Part III explains the pre-establishment rights and 
obligations in both the NZCFTA and the Overseas Investment Act. Part IV 
then analyses how the pre-establishment rights and obligations achieve, or 
do not achieve the objectives identified in Part II. Finally, Part V concludes 
by indicating how the ambiguity in the operation of these instruments 
offers an explanation for the relatively low levels of investment despite the 
signing of the NZCFTA. Measures are then suggested that might help to 
better achieve the objectives sought by the NZCFTA and IIAs generally, 
thus increasing the levels of inward FDI. 
 
 
 
 
II International Investment Agreement Objectives 
 
An IIA is an agreement regulating the flow of investments between two or 
more sovereign states. Such agreements create obligations that extend 
beyond the minimum standard of protection that must be granted to aliens 
and their property by a host state under customary international law, thus 
 
 
5 Chapter 11, Article 136 states that: 
The objectives of this Chapter are to: 
a. encourage and promote the flow of investment between the 
Parties and cooperation between the Parties on investment- 
related matters on a mutually beneficial basis; 
b. establish a framework of rules conducive to increasing 
investment flows between the Parties and to ensure the protection 
and security of investments of the other Party within each Party‟s 
territory; and 
c. promote cooperation between a Party and investors of the other Party 
who have investments in the territory of the former Party, on a 
mutually beneficial basis. 
6 IIAs include both the more traditional and prevalent bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs), as well as the recent practice of including investment provisions 
similar to BITs within preferential trade agreements (PTAs). 
7 “Pre-establishment” refers to the phase in which an investor or investment 
seeks entry into the domestic territory of the home state. “Post-establishment”, by 
contrast, refers to the phase after which an investor or investment has been granted 
entry and is operating within the territory of the host country. 
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providing “supplementary and complimentary protection” to foreign 
investors.8 Generally, when entering into an IIA, parties seek three key 
objectives: investment protection, investment promotion and liberalization.9 
In terms of investment protection, investors from developed states require a 
stable international legal framework when investing in developing states in 
order to guarantee investment security.10 Conversely, developing states 
seeking foreign capital and technological expertise tend to enter into such 
agreements to promote inward foreign investment. The basic reasoning 
underlying this relationship, is that “clear and enforceable rules … reduces 
risks that the investor would otherwise face and … such reductions in risk, 
all things  being  equal, encourage investment”.11 IIAs  also promote 
liberalization, although ordinarily this is not explicitly outlined as an 
objective. Liberalization in this context seeks to facilitate the international 
flow of investments and involves states dismantling regulatory barriers that 
might impede foreign investments. 
 
A Protection 
Investment protection is a fundamental objective underpinning IIAs, 
achieved principally by establishing rules governing the treatment of an 
investor and/or investment  by a host  state.12 Such provisions tend to 
include substantive protections against, for example, uncompensated 
expropriation, currency exchange controls, or war and civil disturbances, 
while establishing legal mechanisms for enforcing those protections.13 The 
protective elements of an IIA generally apply once an investment has been 
established, hence this objective is not so concerned with the pre- 
establishment phase. However, where investor-state dispute settlement 
(ISDS) provisions within the IIA are extended to the pre-establishment 
phase of an investment, this creates real protection around the right to 
invest,14  and thus protects an investor who expends transaction costs15 
 
 
 
8 Surya P Subedi International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and 
Principle (2nd ed, Hart Publishing, 2012) at 55-56. 
9 Jeswald W Salacuse and Nicholas P Sullivan “Do BITs Really Work?: An 
Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain” (2005) 46 
Harv Int‟l LJ 67 at 76-79. 
10 Most of the literature focuses on agreements between developed and 
developing countries. However, there are numerous IIAs between developed 
countries and between developing countries respectively. In general, such 
agreements still seek the same three fundamental objectives even though the 
significance attached to each might differ depending on the relationship. 
11 Salacuse and Sullivan, above n 9, at 77; Bernard Hoekman and Richard 
Newfarmer “Preferential Trade Agreements, Investment Disciplines and Investment 
Flows” (2005) 39(5) JWT 949 at 950. 
12 Salacuse and Sullivan, above n 9, at 79. 
13 Kenneth J Vandevelde “The Political Economy of a Bilateral Investment 
Treaty” (1998) 92 Am J Int‟l L 621 at 632. 
14 For example, in the 2006 Canada-Peru BIT. 
15 Transaction costs can be understood as those costs that arise in the process of 
actualizing and enforcing an investment. A distinction can be made between ex 
ante transaction costs, and ex post transaction costs. Ex ante costs are the costs 
involved with setting up an investment, whereas ex post costs, are those costs 
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only to have entry of an investment declined where consent should have 
been granted in line with those rights extended under the IIA. 
 
B Promotion 
Foreign investment is often a crucial component  in a state‟s economic 
development. Thus investment promotion – that is, creating and 
maintaining a favourable investment climate in order to attract foreign 
investment – is a central objective in the signing of IIAs, particularly for 
developing states.16 As outlined above, the idea is that the existence of clear 
and enforceable rules reduces the level of risk associated with investment in 
the host state, and in turn, this reduction in risk promotes investment.17 
Consequently, there is an indirect promotional gain in the extension of an 
enforceable right to invest insofar as this reduces the risks around the 
establishment of an investment. 
 
However, it is important to note that IIAs are certainly not the only, or even 
the primary influence on investment decisions made by foreign investors. 
Variables such as political stability, local economic conditions and 
government policies are more important in determining foreign investment 
decisions.18 In other words, an IIA “cannot substitute for an inadequate 
investment climate”.19 Indeed, it is argued that capital-exporting states are 
unlikely to sign IIAs containing the desired protective provisions with 
capital-importing states whose investment regimes are not already 
sufficiently amenable to foreign investment. Rather, the IIA serves to lock in 
such favourable treatment as an international law obligation, in effect 
stabilizing the favourable investment climate as it exists when the IIA is 
signed. This then promotes investment by ensuring clarity and 
enforceability of rules, thus reducing the estimation of risk, especially when 
associated with a long-term investment.20 
 
The inclusion of “transparency” provisions that, for instance, require the 
parties to publicise domestic laws and regulations relating to investment or 
establish mechanisms advertising to one party‟s investors investment 
opportunities in the territory of the other party, can also be beneficial in 
terms of investment promotion. Such commitments serve to strengthen 
 
 
 
involved in enforcing rights associated with that investment once established. As 
this paper is focused on pre-establishment, references to transaction costs can be 
taken to refer to ex ante transaction costs. See: Cheryl W Gray and William W 
Jarosz “Law and the Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment: The Experience from 
Central and Eastern Europe” (1995) 33 Colum J Transnat‟l L 1 at 15. 
16 Hoekman and Newfarmer, above n 11, at 949; United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) International Investment Rule-Making: 
Stocktaking, Challenges and the Way Forward (2008) at 38-39. 
17 Salacuse and Sullivan, above n 9, at 95. 
18 Salacuse and Sullivan, above n 9, at 96. 
19 Hoekman and Newfarmer, above n 11, at 964. 
20 Kenneth J Vandevelde “Investment Liberalization and Economic Development: 
The Role of Bilateral Investment Treaties” (1998) 36 Colum J Transnat‟l L 501 at 
523. 
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transparency by addressing lack of information, a form of market failure.21 
While generally absent from traditional BITs, such provisions are 
increasingly being included in preferential trade agreements (PTAs).22 
 
C Liberalization 
The ideal of liberalization holds that unimpeded by regulatory barriers, the 
market will allocate capital in the most economically efficient way. As such, 
IIAs present themselves as instruments of investment liberalization in the 
sense that such agreements restrict a party‟s regulatory discretion with 
respect to the treatment of investors and investments of the other party to 
the agreement, especially where rights are extended to the pre- 
establishment phase.23 The key liberalizing provisions in an IIA are the non- 
discrimination provisions: specifically, national treatment (NT) and most- 
favoured-nation (MFN) treatment; and the scope of these non-discrimination 
provisions is fundamental in determining the extent of liberalization that 
can be achieved. 
 
1 National treatment 
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) have 
defined NT as “a principle whereby a host country extends to foreign 
investors treatment that is at least as favourable as the treatment that it 
accords to national investors in like circumstances”.24 NT is therefore a 
treaty-based, relative standard, with the basis of comparison the treatment 
afforded to a domestic investor operating in the host country in like 
circumstances. In line with the liberalization objective, an NT provision 
seeks the efficient operation of the states‟ economies by eliminating 
distortions in competition.25 While NT in most IIAs applies only post- 
establishment, increasingly NT is being extended to the pre-establishment 
phase, which further achieves equality of competitive conditions. NT, 
particularly where extended to the pre-establishment phase, is therefore an 
important tool for liberalization. However, because in its purest form the 
standard eliminates the ability of states to discriminate whatsoever between 
national and non-national firms in the establishment of investments, it is 
unsurprising that no IIA has yet granted NT without significant 
qualifications. 
 
2 Most-favoured-nation treatment 
MFN is a principle whereby the granting party extends to the beneficiary 
party and foreign investors of that party, treatment that is no less 
favourable than treatment accorded to any third state and foreign investors 
of any third state in like circumstances.26 In that sense, it is a very similar 
formula to NT but concerns treatment afforded to investors of third states 
rather than domestic investors. However, compared with NT, MFN is very 
much a secondary standard and not a liberalizing standard in itself. Rather, 
 
 
21 Vandevelde, above n 20, at 513-514. 
22 UNCTAD, above n 16, at 45-46. 
23 UNCTAD, above n 16, at 45. 
24 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) National 
Treatment (1999) at 1. 
25 UNCTAD, above n 24, at 3. 
26 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Most-
Favoured-Nation Treatment (2010) at 13. 
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MFN serves to ensure that liberalization measures granted to any third 
state in future agreements will also apply to the party to whom MFN 
treatment has been extended in an earlier agreement. Naturally, MFN also 
applies where preferential treatment has been extended in practice to the 
investor of a third party. Thus the objective underpinning an MFN clause is 
to guarantee equality in competitive conditions extended to investors from 
different states, in a constant, self-adapting form.27 As with NT, MFN is a 
relative, treaty-based standard, the scope of which depends on the 
particular agreement. 
 
3        Rights of entry and establishment 
Under customary international law, every state has the sovereign right to 
regulate the entry and establishment of FDI within its own territory. That 
right can be restricted only by international agreement and occurs where 
NT and MFN provisions in an IIA are extended to the pre-establishment 
phase. The practical consequence of the extended scope of these provisions 
is that foreign investors are protected against wasting transaction costs 
associated with preparing to invest, as well as foregoing alternative 
investment opportunities where access to the host state market is prevented 
as a result of preferential treatment being afforded to either domestic, or 
other foreign investors.28 Put another way, pre-establishment rights clarify 
and give certainty to the rules by which investments can be made, which 
reduce investors‟ estimations of risk and thus encourage greater investment 
flows. 
 
Host states may, however, find it desirable to retain control over conditions 
of entry and establishment for a number of reasons. These might include 
national security, public health and safety, and the pursuit of national 
economic policies.29 Regulation of a right of admission and establishment 
can be achieved by way of a discretionary “screening” mechanism. Such a 
mechanism involves a case-by-case assessment of proposed foreign 
investments by an administrative agency, against a set of criteria to 
determine whether or not a proposed investment is consistent with the 
policies of the host state.30 While such laws are often utilized by host states 
who employ broadly restrictive regimes governing foreign investments, 
screening may also be used by states welcoming of foreign investment, “as 
the sole technique of regulation, unaccompanied by any  statutory 
requirements concerning permissible limits of foreign ownership and/or 
control, … aimed only at ensuring official scrutiny and approval of proposed 
investments”.31 
 
 
 
 
27 Subedi, above n 8, at 67-68. 
28 Ignacio Gómez-Palacio and Peter Muchlinksi “Admission and Establishment” 
in P Muchlinski (ed) The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008) 55 at 231. 
29 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
Admission and Establishment (2002) at 11. 
30 Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah The International Law On Foreign Investment 
(2nd Ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004) at 117. 
31 Gómez-Palacio and Muchlinksi, above n 28, at 237-238. 
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There are a number of different identifiable approaches to the regulation of 
the entry and establishment of foreign investments in IIAs.32 Gómez-Palacio 
and Muchlinksi have identified two principal models that have emerged: the 
“controlled-entry” model and the “full liberalization” model.33 The 
“controlled entry” model does not extend positive rights to foreign investors. 
Rather, the approach upholds a state‟s right to regulate conditions of entry, 
maintaining the state‟s sovereignty in sacrifice of greater economic 
efficiency. As a state following this model has made no legal commitment to 
any degree of liberalization concerning conditions of entry, that state is free 
to amend its laws and regulations relating to admission and establishment 
in line with domestic policy. 
 
The “full liberalization” model, by contrast, grants both NT and MFN in the 
pre-establishment phase. As a consequence, the decision to invest by a 
foreign investor of the beneficiary state is more purely informed by 
economic rationales, as this model removes any regulatory barriers that 
would prohibit entry, or that would restrict entry to investors and/or 
investments that fulfil certain conditions with the effect of reducing the 
value of the investment.34 However, there are a number of reasons why 
such a degree of liberalization may not be beneficial, and where a degree of 
regulatory discretion may actually be advantageous. For example, following 
this model may prevent the host state from promoting domestic 
entrepreneurial activity, thus hindering the development of what could 
ultimately evolve into highly competitive domestic industries. Alternatively, 
it may be desirable to ensure that foreign firms are committed to the host 
country and that the investment will contribute positively, or at least not 
detrimentally affect the host country economy.35 While not as widespread as 
the controlled entry model, the full liberalization model has been favoured 
in a number of recent FTAs and in the United States and Canada BITs 
generally.36 
 
As a final point, it must be noted that no state follows an “absolutist 
approach” to investment liberalization. Such an approach would require 
“foreign investors … not be subject to legal or regulatory constraints in 
undertaking investments in the country concerned”.37 As such, even IIAs 
abiding by the full liberalization model tend to include exemptions for “non- 
conforming measures”. For example, the US Model BIT 2004 outlines that 
NT and MFN do not  apply to any non-conforming measure set out in 
annexes of the governing agreement. These annexes then set out a negative 
list; that is, a list of either generic or specific exemptions from NT and MFN 
treatment. However, while pre-establishment liberalization is therefore 
qualified, these lists still set a benchmark of liberalization beneath which 
 
 
 
 
32 UNCTAD have identified five major models. See: UNCTAD, above n 29, at 3. 
33 Gómez-Palacio and Muchlinksi, above n 28, at 239-240. 
34 Gómez-Palacio and Muchlinski, above n 28, at 242-243. 
35 Gómez-Palacio and Muchlinski, above n 28, at 253. 
36 Gómez-Palacio and Muchlinski, above n 28, at 243-244; Vandevelde, above 
n 13, at 635. 
37 Salacuse & Sullivan, above n 9, at 91. 
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the granting state may not fall.38 
 
 
 
III Pre-establishment rights and obligations under the New Zealand–China 
Free Trade Agreement and the Overseas Investment Act 2005 
 
A The New Zealand–China Free Trade 
Agreement 
New Zealand has long been a strong advocate of a liberal international trade 
and investment regime and the NZCFTA is very much in line with New 
Zealand‟s economic strategy. Encouraged by: (1) a series of negative 
experiences, including the ascension of Britain to the European Economic 
Community and the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA); (2) a positive experience in Closer Economic Relations (CER) with 
Australia; and (3) the stalling of the Doha round of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO); and in line with its liberal reputation, New Zealand has 
actively pursued regional integration in the Asia–Pacific, including fostering 
a strong economic relationship with China, culminating in the NZCFTA.39 
 
China, on the other hand, has traditionally harboured a critical view 
towards international economic integration, particularly towards 
international legal protections of foreign investment. Consequently, the kind 
of international investment agreements China commonly entered into were 
of limited scope.40 However, from the late-1990s, alongside the country‟s 
rise as a major economic power, China began to enter into more 
internationally orthodox IIAs. Undoubtedly, this was influenced by China‟s 
increasing role as a capital-exporter. Since 2000, levels of Chinese outward 
FDI have accelerated hugely as a consequence of the Chinese Government‟s 
“Go Global” strategy. Most of this increased outward FDI has been 
directed towards other developing states however and outward FDI flows 
from China into developed states remain relatively small.41 The State has 
clearly realized the benefits of entering into more comprehensive 
agreements that protect its own investors investing abroad, in addition to 
promoting inward investment flows. 
 
Interestingly, the investment relationship between New Zealand and China 
is a somewhat anomalous one in contrast to the traditional investment 
relationships under which an IIA is developed. Commonly, when IIAs 
are concluded between a developing and a developed country, the 
developing country is the capital-importer and the developed is the capital-
exporter. The situation in the NZCFTA is quite different. Here, the  
 
 
 
 
38 Gómez-Palacio & Muchlinski, above n 28, at 242-243. 
39 Young, above n 4, at 7. 
40 For example, the Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement (IPPA), signed 
in 1989 between New Zealand and China. 
41 Stephan W Schill “Tearing Down the Great Wall – the New Generation 
Investment Treaties of the People‟s Republic of China” (2007) Paper 1928 (bepress 
Legal Series, Max Planck Institute for International Law, 2007 at 2 and 6-7; Ken 
Davies “While global FDI falls, China‟s outward FDI doubles” in Karl P Sauvant 
and others (eds) Inward and Outward FDI Country Profiles (eBook ed, Vale 
Columbia Center On Sustainable International Investment, New York, 2011) 241 at 
241-242. 
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developing country, China,  is the net capital exporter, while the 
developed,  New Zealand,  is the net capital importer. The total stock of 
Chinese investment in New Zealand as of year-end March 2011, was 
NZ$1.8 billion, whereas the total stock of New Zealand investment in 
China at the same point was NZ$769 million.42 In this sense, the 
positions and objectives are reversed, or, at the very least, this creates an 
investment relationship that is more consistent with the notion of 
reciprocity that governs IIAs between developed states. 
 
In terms of pre-establishment rights, the NZCFTA is a hybrid model, 
operating between the controlled entry and full liberalization models 
identified above. Article 138, the NT provision, provides: 
 
Each party shall accord to investments and activities associated with 
such investments, with respect to management, conduct, operation, 
maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal, by investors of the other 
Party treatment no less favourable than that accorded, in like 
circumstances, to the investments and associated activities by its own 
investors. 
 
By contrast, Article 139, the MFN treatment provision, provides: 
 
Each Party shall accord to investors, investments and activities 
associated with such investments by investors of the other Party 
treatment no less favourable than that accorded, in like circumstances, 
to the investments and associated activities by the investors of any third 
country with respect to admission, expansion, management, conduct, 
operation, maintenance, use, enjoyment, and disposal.43 
 
Notably, “admission” and “expansion” – the relevant pre-establishment 
rights – are extended to MFN treatment, but no pre-establishment rights are 
accorded in respect of NT. This means that the rights to entry granted 
under the NZCFTA are closer to the controlled-entry model than to the full 
liberalization model. As described above, this is because NT is the key 
liberalizing measure.44 The MFN treatment provision merely imposes a 
practical obligation upon the parties to not extend preferential treatment to 
any investor from a third state,45  while ensuring any further liberalization 
 
 
42 Young, above n 4, at 12. 
43 Emphasis added. 
44 UNCTAD, above n 26, at 102-103. 
45 That is, however, unless that investor is covered under an agreement 
existing before the NZCFTA came into force. Article 139.3 outlines that “the Parties 
reserve the right to adopt or maintain any measure that accords differential 
treatment to third countries under any free trade agreement or multilateral 
international agreement in force or signed prior to the date of entry into force of this 
Agreement” (emphasis added), for example, the New Zealand-Australia Closer 
Economic Relations Agreement 1983. Furthermore, any measures taken as part of 
further economic integration between parties subject to these existing agreements 
are exempt from MFN under the NZCFTA (Article 139.4). Thus, changes can be 
made to deepen these pre-existing agreements without the obligation of extending 
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measures contained in future agreements with third parties will be 
automatically extended to the relevant beneficiary party under the 
NZCFTA.46 
 
Ostensibly, this formulation of pre-establishment rights was at the behest of 
China. New Zealand pursues a policy of non-discrimination towards 
investor nationality with regard to FDI,47 and in its National Interest 
Analysis of the NZCFTA, the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade (MFAT) made it clear that the New Zealand negotiators sought 
stronger reciprocal treatment on entry and establishment rights. The report 
notes that New Zealand “sought to gain immediate commitments on market 
access in order to provide additional benefits to New Zealand investors 
setting up business in China, or expanding their operation there”, and that 
“[w]hile the FTA does not include any initial market access improvements”, 
the MFN treatment provision would ensure any future liberalization in this 
area would be extended to New Zealand investors.48 Furthermore, in a 
report analysing China‟s approval processes, the United States Chamber of 
Commerce has identified that China‟s entry scheme fosters and facilitates 
the favouring of domestic competitors over foreign investors.49 Similarly, 
China has also instituted preferential policies in favour of FDI in certain 
sectors. Such manipulation of the competitive environment is inconsistent 
with NT, thus the approach taken in respect of pre-establishment rights in 
the NZCFTA seems more consistent with China‟s approach than with New 
Zealand‟s predominantly non-discriminatory policies toward FDI. 
 
Ultimately, New Zealand has since signed the New Zealand–Malaysia Free 
Trade Agreement (NZMFTA) and the ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand Free 
Trade Agreement (AANZFTA), both of which include NT pre-establishment 
rights. Article 10.4 of the NZMFTA, for example, provides: 
 
Each Party shall accord to investors of the other Party and to 
covered investments in relation to establishment, acquisition, expansion, 
management, conduct, operation, liquidation, sale, transfer, or other 
disposition of investments, treatment no less favourable than it accords, 
in like circumstances, to its own investors and their investments.50 
 
 
 
 
 
the deepened preferential treatment to China. It is also necessary to note that 
application of MFN may not be simple. The words “in like circumstances” may allow 
differential treatment where the proposed investment and circumstances 
surrounding the investment are sufficiently distinguishable. See: Salacuse & 
Sullivan, above n 9, at 93-94; UNCTAD, above n 24, at 33. 
46 Article 139.5 provides an exception for future measures that extend to a third 
country, preferential treatment in respect of: (a) fisheries; and (b) maritime 
matters. 
47 Ministry of Commerce, China & Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, New 
Zealand A Joint Study Report on a Free Trade Agreement Between China and New 
Zealand at 47. 
48 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) New Zealand–China Free 
Trade Agreement (and Associated Instruments): National Interest Analysis at 
3.3.4. 
49 US Chamber of Commerce China’s Approval Process for Inbound Direct 
Investment: Impact on Market Access National Treatment and Transparency 
(November 2012) at 53. 
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Thus, by virtue of the MFN treatment provision in the NZCFTA, those pre- 
establishment NT rights – “establishment”, “acquisition” and “expansion” – 
now apply in respect of Chinese investors, investing or seeking to invest in 
New Zealand. While such an extension would seem therefore to abide by the 
full liberalization model, it must be noted that under Article 141 in the 
NZCFTA and Article 10.11 in the NZMFTA, New Zealand‟s obligations under 
NT and MFN are subject to an exception for existing non-conforming 
measures, defined by MFAT as “existing laws and regulations that are not in 
conformance with the FTA”.51 Of most significance is operation of the 
Overseas Investment Act 2005 and Overseas Investment Regulations 2005, 
which together see New Zealand retain significant control over conditions of 
entry with regard to certain investments.52 Specifically, the Act requires 
screening of foreign investments involving NZ$100 million or more in value 
or involving sensitive land. Thus, although New Zealand‟s international 
arrangements may abide by the full liberalization model, pre-establishment 
rights remain considerably qualified by this domestic screening mechanism. 
 
Additionally, although pre-establishment rights have been extended both 
with respect of MFN treatment and NT, the right to submit a dispute for 
international arbitration under the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
provisions contained both within the NZCFTA and the NZMFTA, does not 
extend to the pre-establishment phase. MFAT specifically noted in the 
NZCFTA National Interest Analysis:53 
 
[I]nvestor-state arbitration applies only to disputes “directly concerning 
investments” made in the territory of the other party (i.e. actual 
investments which have been made). As a consequence, decisions related 
to the screening of investment into New Zealand under the Overseas 
Investment Act 2005 are not subject to such arbitration. 
 
The NZMFTA follows the same formulation, with MFAT specifying, “actions 
relating to decisions on potential investments into New Zealand under the 
Overseas Investment Act 2005 are not subject to investor-state 
arbitration”.54 Consequently, as far as the enforcement of pre-establishment 
rights is concerned, investors are confined to challenging screening 
decisions made under the Act through the New Zealand courts in judicial 
 
 
 
50 Emphasis added. 
51 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade “Investment” (16 July 2010) New 
Zealand China Free Trade Agreement 
<www.chinafta.govt.nz/1-The-agreement/1-Key-outcomes/3-
Investment/index.php>. 
52 See: MFAT, above n 48, at 4.11 and 4.17; Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
(MFAT) New Zealand–Malaysia Free Trade Agreement (and Associated Instruments): 
National Interest Analysis at s 4.10. 
53 MFAT, above n 48, at 4.11, emphasis added; See also: New Zealand–China 
Free Trade Agreement Bill (210–1) and the Free Trade Agreement between the 
Government of New Zealand and the Government of the People‟s Republic of 
China (select committee report) at 71. 
54 MFAT, above n 52, at 4.10.1. 
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review. 
 
B The Overseas Investment Act 2005 
As highlighted above, fundamentally the Overseas Investment Act operates 
as a screening mechanism where an entity with a foreign controlling 
interest of 25 per cent or more, proposes an investment involving either: (1) 
assets worth NZ$100 million or more; or (2) sensitive land. Part 2 of the Act 
– the consent  and  conditions regime – operates as follows. Section 10 
outlines that foreign investment requires consent under the Act, either 
where it concerns “sensitive land”, as defined in s 12, or “significant 
business assets”, as defined in s 13. Section 16 outlines the criteria for 
consent for overseas investment in sensitive land, and s 18 outlines the 
criteria where the overseas investment is in significant business assets. The 
relevant Minister must grant consent if the criteria in either s 16 or s 18 are 
satisfied, and similarly, the application must be declined if those criteria are 
not satisfied.55 
 
Both ss 16 and 18 require the investor to satisfy the “investor test”, which 
includes a determination of the investor‟s: (1) business experience and 
acumen; (2) financial commitment; and (3) good character. It also requires 
that the investor is not an ineligible individual under the Immigration Act 
2009.56 What constitutes business experience and acumen is not defined in 
the Act, but Overseas Investment Office (OIO) guidelines outline that it 
requires that the investor exhibit “practical knowledge and abilities 
relevant to the overseas investment”.57 The OIO guidelines also outline 
that a demonstrated financial commitment must be with reference to the 
specific investment proposal in question and must be more than mere 
access to capital. The investor is required to give “specific evidence that a 
particular part of the capital has been set aside for the investment, or 
that the particular capital required has been called up”.58 Finally, a test 
for determining good character is outlined in s 19(1) of the Act. This test 
requires that the relevant ministers take account  of: (1) “offences or 
contraventions by law”, either by the individual investor, “or by any person 
in which the individual has, or had at the time of the offence or 
contravention, a 25% or more ownership or control interest (whether 
convicted or not)”;59 and (2) “any other matter than reflects adversely on the 
person‟s fitness to have the particular overseas investment”.60 The OIO 
guidelines clarify that this refers not only to criminal convictions, but  also 
more generally, that “character” concerns both “moral factors” and 
“reputation”, and thus allegations of immoral behaviour and/or other 
activities or behaviour adversely affecting an individuals reputation, may 
be taken into account.61 
 
 
 
 
55 Section 14. 
56 Land Information New Zealand (LINZ) Investor Test Criteria (Overseas 
Investment Office, July 2011) at 1. 
57 LINZ, above n 56, at 1-2. See the document for a list of specific examples of 
evidence required by the Overseas Investment Office (OIO), and what this evidence 
should demonstrate. 
58 LINZ, above n 56, at 2. 
59 Section 19(1)(a). 
60 Section 19(1)(b). 
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An application concerning significant business assets requires satisfaction 
of the “investor test” only.62 By contrast, an application for sensitive land,63 
requires foreign investors not intending to reside indefinitely in New 
Zealand to satisfy not only the “investor test”, but also to show that the 
proposed investment will, or is likely to benefit New Zealand. Moreover, 
where “the relevant land includes non-urban land that exceeds five hectares 
… the relevant Ministers or the regulator must determine that the benefit 
will or is likely to be “substantial and identifiable””.64 Benefit to New 
Zealand is determined with reference to the comprehensive list of economic 
and conservational factors listed in s 17.65 Additionally, as determined in 
Tiroa E and Te Hape B Trusts v Chief Executive of Land Information New 
Zealand (Tiroa E), whether or not the investment will, or is likely to benefit 
New Zealand is assessed with regard to a “with or without” counterfactual 
test; that is, the relevant Minister must determine what the state of the 
sensitive land would be with or without the overseas investment in 
question.66 
 
 
 
IV The  Pre-Establishment  Scheme  and  the  Objectives  of  International 
Investment Agreements 
 
Investment promotion is a key objective explicitly outlined in the NZCFTA. 67 
From New Zealand‟s perspective particularly, FDI is a crucial driver of 
 
 
 
61 LINZ, above n 56, pp 2-3. The OIO rejected a bid by the Hong Kong-based 
Natural Dairy and its New Zealand-based sister company, UBNZ Asset Holdings 
to buy a set of New Zealand farms – the Crafar farms – on the basis that its 
directors and frontwoman May Wang, failed the “good character” test. 
62 Section 18. 
63 “Sensitive land” involves land of a particular size and/or characteristic, as defined 
in s 12 and Schedule 1 of the Act. 
64 Land Information New Zealand (LINZ) Sensitive Land (Overseas Investment 
Office, July 2011) at 3. While “substantial and identifiable benefit” is not defined in 
the Act, the OIO recognises that “the fact that section 16(1)(e)(ii) refers simply to a 
“benefit” whereas section 16(1)(e)(iii) refers to “substantial and identifiable benefit” 
suggests a degree of differentiation. Thus the degree of benefit required to be 
established under section 16(1)(e)(iii) will need to be greater than the benefit under 
section 16(1)(e)(ii)”. See: Land Information New Zealand (LINZ) Benefit to New 
Zealand factors (Overseas Investment Office, June 2009) at 2. 
65 Note, s 17(g) of the Act points to factors set out in regulations. The relevant 
regulations are found in r 28 of the Overseas Investment Regulations 2005. 
Factors not listed in s 17 of the Act and r 28 of the Regulations are not relevant 
in determining benefits to New Zealand. Note also, s 16(e)(ii) requires that the 
assessment of benefits must be positive. Investments deemed to be neutral must 
be declined. 
66 Tiroa E and Te Hape B Trusts v Chief Executive of Land Information New 
Zealand [2012] NZHC 147 at [35]. 
67 Article 136. 
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economic growth as the country‟s private domestic savings are inadequate 
to cover its investment needs and this informs New Zealand‟s international 
economic strategy in terms of investment. The achievement of promotional 
gains relies on both the clarity and enforceability of legal rights and 
obligations, and the operation and interaction of the NZCFTA and the 
Overseas Investment Act raise concerns in respect of both elements. 
 
In terms of the NZCFTA, both the text of the investment chapter and the 
way in which the FTA‟s operation is informed by New Zealand‟s subsequent 
IIAs, are not well understood. Indeed, the rights regarding the admissibility 
of pre-establishment disputes to the nominated international arbitral 
tribunals were a source of some confusion in the recent, successful bid by 
the Chinese-owned Milk New Zealand Holdings Ltd, (a subsidiary of 
Shanghai Pengxin Group Co Ltd (Shanghai Pengxin)), to buy the Crafar 
farms. The Crafar farms are a set of 16 New Zealand farms previously 
owned by the Crafar family. On the advice of the OIO, the relevant 
Ministers agreed that the relevant criteria under the Overseas 
Investment Act and the Overseas Investment Regulations had been met 
and they approved Shanghai Pengxin‟s application on 27 January 2012.68  
The Ministers‟ decision was subsequently judicially reviewed on 
application by a rival bidder. After the decision had been announced, some 
New Zealand commentary illustrated misunderstandings regarding the 
rights of admissibility of disputes extended to affected Chinese investors 
where pre-establishment obligations have not been met. Professor Jane 
Kelsey, for example, claimed that if the Ministers had declined Shanghai 
Pengxin‟s application to purchase the farms, the New Zealand 
Government “could have faced an international law suit for breaching its 
free trade agreement with China”.69 However, as has been shown, the right 
to submit a dispute for international arbitration under the ISDS provisions 
contained within the NZCFTA does not extend to the pre-establishment 
phase. Thus, had Shanghai Pengxin‟s application been declined, the 
company would not have had the right to challenge that decision under 
the NZCFTA in an international arbitral tribunal. 
 
The operation of the Overseas Investment Act also lacks certainty. The Act 
allows ministers significant discretion in the weight to be given to each of 
the factors in s 17. Section 17(1)(c) provides that ministers may “determine 
the relative importance to be given to each relevant factor”. Furthermore, in 
2010, the Government introduced two new tests into r 28 of the Overseas 
Investment Regulations 2005:70 an “economic interests” test71 and a 
“mitigating factors” test,72 both of which allowed more discretion in what 
the OECD has referred to as “an already complex and non-transparent 
 
 
 
68 Jonathan Coleman and Maurice Williamson “Ministers approve Crafar farms 
bid” (press release, 27 January 2012). 
69 Professor Jane Kelsey “China Could Have Sued Under FTA if Crafar Farm Sale 
Declined” (press release, 30 January 2012). 
70 Bill English “New investment rules strike the right balance” (press 
release, 27 September 2010). 
71 Regulation 28(i). 
72 Regulation 28(j). 
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regime”.73 Assessments under the Act consequently have the potential to 
allow the Government to pursue different policies within the existing 
framework, which could allow very different decisions where different 
ministers emphasize and play down different factors. This naturally reduces 
transparency in the decision-making process and consequently frustrates 
investor certainty concerning the way in which the criteria will be applied to 
a proposed investment. 
 
The increase in transaction costs deriving from the lack of certainty and 
non-transparent nature of the Act can be seen in Shanghai Pengxin‟s 
application to acquire the Crafar farms. The application notes:74 
 
The Applicant has acted entirely in good faith and has used all its 
best endeavours, including extensive use of consultants within New 
Zealand, to satisfy the requirements of the Act. 
 
This accords with the typical experience of overseas investors dealing with 
the Act. New Zealand law firm Chapman Tripp have noted that such 
investors are “generally surprised at the level of detail and effort required to 
get an application over the line”.75 
 
Similarly, the negative effect on promotional gains engendered by this 
uncertainty can be seen in the judicial review of the Ministers‟ approval of 
Shanghai Pengxin‟s application. In Tiroa E, Miller J determined that the OIO 
had been applying an incorrect counterfactual for determining whether an 
overseas investment would, or would likely, benefit New Zealand. 
Whereas the OIO had been assessing the likely benefits “before or after” the 
proposed investment was made, Miller J clarified that the Act 
contemplated a counterfactual that assessed the benefits that would 
accrue “with or without” the overseas investment.76 In a letter from the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Minister for Land Information, it was 
revealed that the challenge and Miller J‟s decision  in  Tiroa  E,  had  
caused “significant confusion in the minds of potential investors as to 
 
 
 
73 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) OECD 
Economic Surveys: New Zealand 2011 (2011) at 125. The review that led to this 
extension in discretion was actually aimed at increasing transparency and 
predictability for foreign investors and some changes were made to reduce the 
number of applications requiring screening and to increase the speed with which 
applications were processed. However, the increase in ministerial discretion and 
retention of the s 17 test where sensitive land is involved means that, in fact, the 
screening mechanism has “become increasingly opaque and need[s] to be 
simplified to increase certainty, clarity and consistency”. See: at 125. 
74 Land Information New Zealand (LINZ) Decision required under the Overseas 
Investment Act 2005: Milk New Zealand Holding Limited (Overseas Investment 
Office, 1090 / 201110035, 19 January 2012) 62, emphasis added. 
75 Chapman Tripp “Removing the muddle from the Overseas Investment 
Act” (10 February 2009). 
<http://www.chapmantripp.com/publications/Pages/Removing-the- muddle-from-
the-Overseas-Investment-Act.aspx>. 
76 At [30]-[45]. 
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whether New Zealand is a stable and certain environment for foreign 
investment”, and that “some potential investors considering investment 
in New Zealand have already been deterred from pursuing their enquiries 
further”.77 All of this shows the very real negative effect that this sort of 
ambiguity in a screening mechanism can have for potential FDI. 
 
By contrast, the certainty sought by the transparency provisions contained 
within the NZCFTA more successfully achieves the promotional objective. 
Article 146 provides, “Each Party shall publish international agreements 
pertaining to investment to which it is a party.” To be sure, this is not as 
comprehensive as, for example, a provision that requires each party to 
publicise all domestic laws and regulations relating to foreign investment. 
However, the FTA does include a further provision concerning the 
promotion and facilitation of investment, in which both Parties “affirm their 
desire” to cooperate and exchange information in order to improve the 
climate for two-way investment, and to build linkages between agencies of 
each Party in order to promote bilateral investment.78 In pursuit of these 
objectives, as of February 2012 New Zealand officials were working with 
China‟s Investment Promotion Agency (CIPA), to prepare “high-quality, up- 
to-date, Chinese-language information on the rules and regulations of 
investment in New Zealand”.79 
 
Just as the lack  of certainty in the operation of the legal instruments 
undermines the promotional objectives of the NZCFTA, lack of enforceability 
also raises some concerns. As outlined in Part II of this paper, ISDS 
provisions extended to cover the pre-establishment phase create a real 
protection around the right to invest. Promotional gains are then achieved 
as potential investors are protected against wasting transaction costs and 
alternative investment opportunities. As has been noted however, although 
pre-establishment rights are extended to Chinese investors, the ISDS 
provisions do not apply to the pre-establishment phase, thus these rights 
lack legal enforceability. Therefore, at face value, the pre-establishment 
rights contained within the NZCFTA should not be particularly effective 
with regard to either protection or promotion. Certainly in a state where the 
domestic judicial system offers little recourse as a result of discernable 
prejudices against foreign investors in the judicial process, the lack of 
enforceable rules in an IIA might be a significant impediment to the 
effective protection of the right to invest.80 However, New Zealand has a 
judicial system underpinned  by a strong adherence to the rule of law 
and thus the lack of enforceability in the NZCFTA is not such an 
impediment to investment promotion. The ability of a  foreign  investor  to  
challenge  a  decision  made  under  the  Overseas Investment Act that is  
 
 
 
77 Letter from Murray McCully (Minister of Foreign Affairs) to Maurice Williamson 
(Minister for Land Information) regarding Miller J‟s decision in Tiroa E & Te Hape 
B v Chief Executive of Land Information New Zealand (13 April 2012) (Obtained 
under Official Information Act 1982 Request to the Office of Hon Maurice 
Williamson). 
78 Article 151. 
79 NZTE and MFAT, above n 2, p 27. 
80 Salacuse & Sullivan, n 9, at 75. 
No. 1 | 2013 China Research Paper 
 
                                     Page 17 of 20 
  
 
 
inconsistent with the pre-establishment  scheme should provide sufficient 
protection concerning the right to invest. Moreover, if the Government 
were to violate its pre-establishment obligations, this would undermine 
New Zealand‟s image as a welcoming destination for FDI, as well as 
detrimentally affecting New Zealand‟s economic relationship with China 
specifically. Accordingly, there are at least incentives underpinning the 
extension of those rights and consequently, the substantive guarantees are 
not meaningless. As such, the promotional objective is achieved to an 
extent, in this respect. 
 
In terms of challenging decisions made under the Overseas Investment Act, 
while the overseas investor has recourse to judicial review in the New 
Zealand courts, decisions can be challenged only on procedural grounds,81 
which, in light of the wide discretion afforded to Ministers, could 
provide an inadequate means of challenging a decision.82 Thus the 
significant transaction costs that may accrue in trying to comply with the 
requirements under the Act, and the lack of any domestic judicial recourse 
concerning the merits of the Ministers‟ decision, risks undermining 
investor confidence,  consequently stifling foreign investment. Indeed, it 
has been suggested that the introduction of merit-based judicial review of 
decisions made under the Act would help bolster the confidence of 
potential foreign investors. It is argued that over time this would 
“standardise interpretation of the Act and permit the reversal of 
anomalous decisions, thus improving the predictability of its 
application”.83 A merit-based judicial review process in New Zealand could 
also engender more certainty than extension of the ISDS provisions to the 
pre-establishment phase. Investor-state arbitrations have produced some 
inconsistent awards which undermine certainty. Furthermore, there is no 
formal system of precedent in investor-state arbitration, and to the extent 
that trends can be identified, the relative dearth of arbitral decisions means 
that they provide minimal guidance.84 New Zealand‟s domestic legal system, 
on the other hand, operates under the doctrine of precedent and with time 
would likely generate the predictability sought by potential foreign 
investors. 
 
Finally, in terms of the level of liberalization achieved by the FTA – or more 
specifically for the purposes of this paper, the facilitation of investment 
inflows into New Zealand – in short, the NZCFTA is relatively ineffective. To 
be sure, MFN treatment is extended to the pre-establishment phase in the 
agreement itself, and NT is extended to pre-establishment by virtue of the 
 
 
 
81 A claim in judicial review against the merits of a decision may be made out on 
the ground of unreasonableness, however unreasonableness is exceptionally 
difficult to prove and in most cases a court will not find on the grounds of 
unreasonableness alone. See: Crown Law Office The Judge Over Your Shoulder 
(Crown Law Office, Wellington, 2005) [54]-[57]. 
82 Dave Heatley and Bronwyn Howell “Overseas Investment: is New Zealand 
„Open for Business‟?” (New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and 
Regulation Inc, 2010) at 36. 
83 Heatley and Howell, above n 82, at 36. 
84 See: John Savage “Investment Treaty Arbitration and Asia: Survey and 
Comment” (2005) 1 AIAJ 3 at 7; UNCTAD, above n 16, at 35. 
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NZMFTA and AANZFTA, hence New Zealand‟s international obligations 
abide by the full liberalization model outlined above. On the other hand, the 
exception for non-conforming measures that sees the continued application 
of the Overseas Investment Act, alongside New Zealand‟s non- 
discriminatory policy towards the nationality of inward foreign investors, 
means that the IIAs themselves do not further liberalize the investment 
regime. However, because the full liberalization model sets a benchmark of 
liberalization beneath which the granting state may not fall, reform of the 
existing non-conforming measures in such a way as to make them more 
restrictive would be inconsistent with the FTA. Not only has New Zealand 
committed to “endeavour to progressively remove … non-conforming 
measures”, but the Agreement notes that MFN obligations are exempted 
from an amendment to non-conforming measures only “to the extent that 
the amendment does not increase the non-conformity of the measure”.85 
This indicates that if the Overseas Investment Act were wound back to 
become more restrictive, New Zealand would be in contravention of its 
obligations in its IIAs. 
 
 
 
V Conclusion 
This paper began by noting that there are three key objectives sought by 
parties to an IIA: protection, promotion and liberalization. As is common in 
such agreements, the investment chapter of the NZCFTA explicitly pursues 
the first two. The agreement seeks to establish rules to “ensure the 
protection and security of investments”, and “encourage and promote the 
flow of investment between the Parties”.86 In terms of liberalization, the 
agreement itself does not profess to pursue liberalization, and does not in 
fact promote a fully liberalized investment relationship. However, by virtue 
of the MFN clause and later IIAs signed by New Zealand, the international 
pre-establishment rights granted to Chinese investors proposing to invest in 
New Zealand now abides by the full liberalization model, with both MFN and 
NT granted in the pre-establishment phase. Despite this, as with other 
states that pursue the full liberalization model, this is a qualified 
liberalization subject to non-conforming measures. As far as foreign 
investment coming into New Zealand is concerned, the most significant 
regulatory barrier constituting a non-conforming measure is the New 
Zealand Overseas Investment Act 2005. The barriers to FDI established in 
the Act are considered to be “relatively onerous” by OECD  standards, 
despite the fact that measured by other indicators New Zealand is one of the 
more liberal OECD countries in terms of international economic relations.87 
 
As this paper has illustrated, the level of predictability engendered by the 
NZCFTA and Overseas Investment Act is undermined by issues of clarity 
and enforceability in those legal instruments‟ operation and interaction. 
First, it is clear that both the text of the agreement and the way in which 
the agreement interacts with New Zealand‟s later IIAs by virtue of MFN, 
have  the  potential  to  cause  confusion  in  the  minds  of  both  overseas 
 
 
 
85 Article 141. 
86 Article 136. 
87 OECD, above n 73, at 123-124. 
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investors and New Zealanders alike. Second, the operation of the Overseas 
Investment Act and its interaction with the NZCFTA is similarly ambiguous 
and unclear. In particular, the Act is complex and relatively non- 
transparent because of the degree of discretion it affords to decision- 
makers. The evidence indicates that this lack of certainty results in 
significantly increased transaction costs, especially for investors seeking to 
invest in “sensitive land”. This level of discretion accompanied by the fact 
that a challenge in judicial review is largely restricted to procedural 
grounds, means that investors have little domestic recourse where the 
decision seems somewhat inconsistent with previous decisions made under 
the Act. Finally, the unenforceability of the legal rights contained within the 
NZCFTA has the potential to undermine investor confidence. However, this 
should not be overstated. There would be significant political and economic 
repercussions if the New Zealand Government were to violate its obligations 
in the FTA. 
 
It bears repeating however, that the operation of these legal instruments is 
in no way the sole explanation for weak inward investment growth in New 
Zealand from Chinese investors. Among other things, New Zealand is a 
small, geographically isolated country, which does not offer the kind of 
large-scale investment opportunities or the significant tax incentives many 
developing countries offer Chinese investors. Consequently, New Zealand 
remains a relatively low-priority destination for Chinese investment. Indeed, 
outward FDI flows from China into developed states generally remain 
relatively low in contrast to China‟s FDI flows into developing counties. 
Further to this, MFAT explicitly noted in its National Interest Analysis that 
as a result of “an historically small investment relationship, modelling … 
assumed that change in investment and capital stock as a consequence of 
the FTA would be minimal”. However, the report also forecasted that the 
commitments on MFN and NT, alongside investment protection and ISDS 
provisions, “should contribute to an increase in investor confidence in the 
investment regime between the two countries”.88 In light of the fact that 
Chinese FDI in New Zealand has not seen the same increases as have 
occurred in the trade relationship, it is arguable that the lack of clarity in 
the operation and interaction of the legal instruments governing that flow of 
investment, and to a lesser extent the unenforceability of the obligations 
contained within them, illustrates that the estimation of risk in the 
establishment of investments, for Chinese investors, remains high. Thus, it 
is necessary to ensure transparency and predictability in the pre- 
establishment phase rights and obligations, as provided by the NZCFTA and 
Overseas Investment Act. To do so should reduce investors‟ estimations of 
risk – specifically wasted transaction costs and alternative investment 
opportunities – and thus encourage greater investment flows. 
 
As compared with investors from New Zealand‟s traditional international 
economic partners, Chinese investors are still relative newcomers to the 
establishment of overseas investment and face in New Zealand a culturally 
different regulatory scheme from that operating in China. Of fundamental 
importance  therefore,  is  the  creation  of  Chinese-language  guidelines 
 
 
 
88 MFAT, above n 48, 6.1.3.5. 
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explaining rights and obligations in the operation and interaction of the 
Overseas Investment Act and the NZCFTA. In light of this, the commitment 
outlined in the New Zealand Government‟s China strategy to work with 
CIPA to produce “high-quality, up-to-date, Chinese-language information on 
the rules and regulations of investment in New Zealand”, is promising.89 Of 
further value would be extensive guidelines on New Zealand‟s IIA framework 
and the way in which the rights and obligations contained  within the 
various IIAs interact with one another and with domestic law, in order to 
facilitate greater understanding both among New Zealanders and overseas 
investors generally. 
 
As a case study illustrating the way in which liberalization is achieved by 
the extension of pre-establishment rights in an IIA, the NZCFTA 
demonstrates that even where an IIA abides by the full liberalization model 
the level of liberalization achieved in the agreement itself is limited. 
Specifically, there is extensive scope in the non-conforming measures 
allowed by the NZCFTA, in particular, the Overseas Investment Act. Thus, 
despite the existence of an IIA that is drafted with a more liberal framework, 
the New Zealand Government retains significant economic levers with which 
to control the entry of Chinese investments into New Zealand. The 
obligations in the NZCFTA merely lock in a level of liberalization in a 
constant, self-adapting form if and when non-conforming measures are 
removed. The current settings consequently achieve the goals of both 
economic liberalism and economic nationalism in that the Agreement 
facilitates and encourages liberalization while allowing the State to retain a 
powerful degree of control over inward FDI. 
 
A more contentious approach to reform therefore, would involve tightening 
up the degree of ministerial discretion permitted under the Act. On the one 
hand, as the OECD has pointed out, the operation of the Overseas 
Investment Act is complex and non-transparent, and needs to be reined in 
to ensure transparency and greater certainty for foreign investors seeking to 
invest. On the other hand, a degree of discretion is desirable as it allows for 
some host state policy flexibility. Ultimately, this is one of the key 
controversies in globalization: balancing the benefits of granting 
international rights in pursuit of globalized markets against the protection 
of host state sovereignty. However, it would be desirable to at least pursue 
some guarantee of consistency in the application of the criteria in the Act in 
order to provide predictability for foreign investors. Certainly, any efforts 
taken to increase transparency and predictability in New Zealand‟s foreign 
investment regime would be a constructive step towards encouraging higher 
levels of foreign investment, both specifically in the China– New Zealand 
economic relationship, and in New Zealand‟s international investment 
relations generally. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
89 NZTE and MFAT, above n 2, at 27. 
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